That Newfangled Technology

Set Phasers on Stun solecism Case 14 That Newfangled Technology Summary On the morning of folk 8, 1923, Lieutenant Commander Donald T. huntsman was assigned to responsible for leading fourteen destroyers of Destroyer Squadron 11 to depart from San Francisco to San Diego. They were returning home after an escorting betrothal Division 4 from Puget Sound to San Francisco. At that time, the Destroyer Squadron comprised with leading flagship that commanded by victor Hunter, USS Delphy (DD-261) and followed by the four ships of Destroyer Division 33, USS S. P. downwind (DD-310), USS teenaged (DD-312), USS Woodbury (DD-309), and USS Nicholas (DD-311) the cinque ships from Destroyer Division 31, USS Farragut (DD-300), USS Fuller (DD-297), USS Percival (DD-298), USS Somers (DD-301), and USS Chauncey (DD-296) and four ships from Destroyer Division 32, USS Kennedy (DD-306), USS capital of Minnesota Hamilton (DD-307), USS Stoddert (DD-302), and USS Thomson (DD-305). The warships conducted tactical gears and weaponry exercises en route, including a competitive speed elude of 20 knots. Later in the day, as weather worsened, the ships formed up a column on the squadron leader Delphy. That evening, around 2000 hours (800 p. . ), the leading flagship mobilize an erroneous report, based on an improperly interpreted radio range bearing, showing the squadrons position about nine miles off Point Arguello. goal an hour later, the destroyers sullen east to enter what was thought to be the Santa Barbara Channel, though it could not be seen owing to the thick fog. Unfortunately, due to a combine of abnormally strong currents and seafaringal complacency, it led the squadron onto the rocks offshore point and disordered area of San Miguel Island, near Honda Point. Just after turning, Delphy struck the rocks at 2105 (905 p. m. ), till ashore at 20 knots.More than worse, Delphy was followed by S. P. Lee, which hit and swung broadside against the bluffs. Young piled up adjace nt to Delphy and capsized, trapping many of her fire and engine board crew below. While Woodbury, Nicholas, and Fuller struck reefs and ran aground offshore, Chauncey ran in close aboard Young. However, the alarm sirens slowed Somers and Farragut enough, so they just touched ground onward backing off to deeper water while the five other destroyers steered whole clear. Although heavy pounding surf broke over the seven desolate destroyers, eventually breaking the Delphy into two parts.Hundreds of thousands gallons of fuel oil from seven ships spilled into the crashing waves, carbide bombs were change integrity when they came in contact with the water, and numerous fires began on the ships and on the surface of the sea. Finally, 23 men died in the ensuring attempts to abandon the ships and make it to shore in the lousiness and heavy surf. About 450 survivors from the seven warships made their way slowly to the narrow down and rocky beach below the cliff during the hour that fol lowed. S. P. Lee S. P. Lee Fuller Fuller Woodbury Woodbury Chauncey Chauncey Delphy Delphy Young Young Nicholas Nicholas What Went WrongIt later turned out to the light that the Squadron was actually several miles north and further east, notwithstanding Captain Hunter had disbelieved the accuracy of a Point Arguello radio signal. quest the turn, Point Arguello was dead ahead, and distant only about two ocean miles. The Point Arguello light may realize been hidden by the fog. However, did Captain Hunter issue an order to change-of course of 95 left turn, or did he order his ships to turn to a bearing of 95 magnetic? Additional Factors Communication between Captain Hunter and Radioman Falls The communion between Captain Hunter and the radioman was misunderstood.The radioman would report the wrong bearings, when the reciprocal bearing should have been reported rather. Had the correct bearings been reported from the beginning, the ship wouldnt have crashed. Newfangled Technology Feedback The mistaken error proved that Captain Hunter cannot always rely on his strong self-reliance and that even a skilled mathematician makes mistakes and that its acceptable to rely on applied science. There was no feedback given back to Captain Hunter to state its reasoning basis the bearing that was being reported to him. Also, there was no feedback given to contest Captain Hunters navigations.If more feedback was given, it could have been sensed that navigation was off route. Continued use of That Newfangled Technology After the hap of being reported the wrong bearings, Captain Hunter tranquil go on to use the navigation by radio bearing. It was assumed as an simple mistake. It wasnt until after the crash that Captain Hunter realized that the radioman was giving him the correct bearings from the beginning. This could have been prevented if the system would have been checked after the low wrong bearing, to see what the reasoning behind such an error was instead of co ntinuing on the journey.More Information According to an article by Noah Andre Trudeau, atomic number 20 Naval History Point Honda A Naval Tragedys Chain of Errors, a lean cipher and distrust of new technology contributed to a naval tragedy at Honda Point, atomic number 20 (Trudeau, 2012). Speed was the meaty creed of the early to mid-20th century destroyer driver. Determination and self-confidence was a style of command in which those qualities could achieve the impossible while in peacetime the same attributes contributed to one of the U. S. Navys most significant disasters (Trudeau, 2012).The 18 ships were meant to travel along the California coast to San Diego, with their two high supply and low powered turbines, four tall thin funnels and a mass speed topped at 32 knots. Due to the postwar budget cutbacks, they were operating at 20-30% below full complement. Although a lot of survive were lost during this tragedy, all the blame wasnt on Captain Hunter. Everyone compete a part, from, Watsons fixation on making a tape 20-knot passage along with his failure to supervise the navigation, Blodgetts inability to bring his concerns, and the silence of the other squadron officers.Uncertainties surround the new technology, unusual weather conditions and pocketable equipment problems also played a part (Trudeau, 2012). Lesson Learned This case illustrated the splendour of human error and testing all new technology in front use. Although all faults in the technology may not be pronto discovered testing all aspects is critical. It is learned that although you may be honorable in a skill and have applicable experience, mistakes still happen. The pack with great skill and power, like Lieutenant Commander Donald T.Hunter, are still fallible as human beings. Despite having a fully run technology system to navigate, it shouldnt completely be dependent on. Instead, the two should assist each other, human intelligence and newfound technology. Additional be ginning Trudeau, N. A. (2012, March 2). California Naval History-Point Honda A Naval Tragedys Chain of Errors. Retrieved October 29, 2012, from The California State armament Museum A United States Army Museum Activity Preserving Californias Military Heritage http//www. militarymuseum. org/PtHonda. html